Draft calls were increased, several reserve divisions were activated, and the defense budget was nearly doubled, rising from 8 percent of the GNP to 14 percent. In the Defense Production Act of July 1950, Truman received authority to set military priorities on the production of certain items essential to the war effort and control wages and prices. On September 8, he issued Executive Order 101 61, establishing the Economic Stabilization Agency (ESA) with statutory authority to administer wage and price controls. Actual control over wages and prices, however, was given to a subordinate Wage Stabilization Board (WSB), composed of a nine-member executive with equal representation from labor, management, and the public. Though the ESA theoretically had to approve requests for wage hikes, in actuality it only rubber-stamped WSB recommendations. To help strengthen the price stabilization program, the administration created a separate agency in November 1950, the Office of Price Stabilization (OPS), to administer price ceilings. The Chinese surprise attack on November 28, 1950 led to an intensification of the mobilization program. Truman declared a state of emergency on December 1 5, 1950, and the next day established the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM), which had authority over production controls and the economic stabilization machinery. Its first head, Charles E. Wilson, was made chief of the whole mobilization effort, the most sweeping delegation of presidential authority up to that time.
The Korean War touched off a consumer spending spree that was only intensified by the Chinese intervention in November. By January 1 951, the consumer price index had risen 1 0.3 points from the period just before the Korean outbreak. In an attempt to bring a halt to the runaway inflation, Truman ordered a general wage-price freeze on January 26, 1951. The economic stabilization machinery administering wage and price controls functioned effectively throughout 1 951. A potential source of trouble arose, however, when the United Steelworkers of America passed resolutions demanding large wage increases. The cost of living had risen significantly since the last settlement and the union felt that its wage rates were lagging behind those that had been awarded to other big unions. The steelworkers union and the steel companies began holding contract talks on November 26, 1951, but the talks ground to a halt two weeks later. The industry stalled on presenting its wage offer to the union because it first wanted assurances of a compensatory price increase from the government, assurances it was not receiving. In spite of the efforts of federal mediators, the union and company negotiations were not nearing a settlement and a strike on December 31, 1951 appeared inevitable. Truman thereupon certified the steel dispute to the Wage Stabilization Board, on December 24, 1951, which was to study the dispute and recommend terms for settlement. The union agreed to postpone its strike.
On March 20, 1952, the WSB announced its recommendations, calling for a 1 2Y2 cents raise effective January 1, 1952 and the introduction of the union shop. The union accepted the terms, but the companies declared that the recommended wage increase could be financed only by a large increase in prices, on the order of $7.00 a ton. The OPS refused to grant such an increase and the industry then refused to come to terms with the union. The union's strike deadline was set for April 8.
THE RATIONAL ACTOR APPROACH
The impending strike posed the problem to Truman of how to maintain steel production. Not only was he vitally interested in the maintenance of steel production, he was keenly aware of the critical demand for steel due to the Korean conflict in particular and the need to increase the United States's military capability and industrial-economic strength in general. Controls had been placed on the production and allocation of steel since the fall of 1950. Even so, the American army in Korea had suffered shortages of ammunition. In June 1951, General Van Fleet, the American commander, had to impose rationing of ammunition, thus slowing American advances in some areas. As Truman observed in December of that year:
It is of the utmost importance to prevent an interruption in the production of steel Steel is a key material in our entire defense effort Each day of steel production lost is a day lost forever in the achievement of our production schedule. Continuous production of this industry is essential in order to meet urgent demands for steel-steel for weapons, for factories, for highways, and hospitals and schools (1 965: 651). Under Truman's direction, the United States had embarked on a vigorous global foreign policy for the first time in its history. During his term in office, he had had to cope with a series of Soviet-generated crises over such places as Turkey, Czechoslovakia, and Berlin. His concern over Soviet designs for world domination was heightened by the Korean War. As Brown (1968) noted, the "overriding fear in the White House was not simply that the loss of the Korean peninsula would encourage the Soviets to embark on further aggressions. Rather, it was that the Soviets were embarked, now, on some pattern of military aggression. . ." and that "a number of small territorial grabs could add up to a critical alteration of the global balance" of power. To increase American power, Truman had instituted a general rearmament program of re-590/ASQ plenishing the military strength that had declined since World War 11 and had increased supplies of military goods to America's allies. Thus, a loss of steel production would weaken the basis of power upon which America's foreign policy rested.
As McConnell (1960: 32) pointed out, Truman had four options to prevent a stoppage of steel: (1) seize the mills under Section 18 of the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948, which authorized the president to place orders with any plant capable of producing materials for the armed forces and to seize them if those orders were not filled; (2) seize the mills under the inherent powers of the president; (3) send a bill to Congress requesting seizure powers; or (4) invoke the procedures provided for by the Taft-Hartley Act.
Seizure under Section 18 required an elaborate series of steps in which production orders were drawn up and served to selected companies, a process estimated to take weeks. Hence, with the strike deadline only a few days away, that option had to be ruled out. Sending a seizure bill to Congress could also take weeks and there was no guarantee that the conservative 82nd Congress would pass the bill. Relying on the Taft-Hartley Act would mean that the union, which had already voluntarily postponed its strike for three months, would be enjoined from striking for 80 days more. Truman felt that its use would be unfair to the union and, more practically, he feared that the union might ignore the injunction, going out on strike and stopping production. Philip Murray (McConnell, 1960: 49) , the steelworker union's boss, was to boast to his members during the dispute that "Taft-Hartley doesn't manufacture steel." The appointment of a fact-finding board, required by the Taft-Hartley Act, would also tend to discredit the wage board (1960: 33).
The only option that would guarantee continued steel production was seizure under the inherent powers of the president. Accordingly, on the evening of April 8, with the strike only hours away, Harry Truman went on the air to announce that he was seizing the nation's steel mills "by virtue of authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and as President of the United States and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States" (United States Senate, 1952: 4). Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer was placed in charge of the seized mills. It is not necessary to recount the famous six-to-three decision of the Supreme Court on June 2 holding Truman's seizure of the steel mills unconstitutional. But it is relevant that upon learning of the Court's decision, the steelworkers immediately went out on strike. Truman once more considered, but rejected, using the Taft-Hartley procedure, again for the same reasons as before. He directed his assistant, John Steelman, to continue the attempt to mediate the dispute. Negotiations came to a stalemate, however, and the strike dragged on for weeks. On July 20, Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett announced that defense stockpiles of steel were running critically low. As he later recalled the situation that July, "We were running down our reserve. We were living on our seed corn. If the hostilities had broken out again or war in the Far East had spread, the United States would be caught absolutely short" (McConnell, 1960: 18 Whatever the six justices of the Supreme Court meant by their differing opinions about the constitutional powers of the President, he must always act in a national emergency It is not very realistic for the justices to say that comprehensive powers shall be available to the President only when a war has been declared or when the country has been invaded. We live in an age when hostilities begin without polite exchanges of diplomatic notes . Nor can we separate the economic facts from the problems of defense and security . . . The President, who is Commander-in-Chief and who represents the interest of all the people, must be able to act at all times to meet any sudden threat to the nation's security A wise President will always work with Congress, but when Congress fails to act or is unable to act in a crisis, the President, under the Constitution, must use his powers to safeguard the nation (1956: 478).
To a number of observers in 1 952, the steel seizure was the action of Harry Truman, the domestic politician par excellence. Many newspapers, business organizations, and Republican congressmen claimed that the seizure was a highhanded attempt to intervene in an industrial dispute, the paying of a "political debt to labor," one steel executive described it (McConnell, 1960: 37) . Though the steel dispute itself was bound up in the domestic politics of Big Labor versus Big Business and Democrats versus Republicans, and though Truman would not have been displeased if the union had been granted a generous wage increase, the seizure must be seen as an action taken primarily in response to international considerations. There was virtually no cooperation or coordination between the two stabilization agencies. In part this was due to design. It was thought that the regulation of wages was best achieved through a special tripartite board. Furthermore, the board was to decide on wage requests according to its guidelines, without reference to the company's ability to pay. There were to be no consultations with the OPS about possible price relief for the company. To allow consultation and coordination, administration officials felt, would invite collusion by industry and labor to get simultaneously substantial wage and price increases (Enarson, 1955: 56). If a company felt that a recent wage hike required raising prices, it could present its case and petition for a raise only after the additional costs of the wage increase had been incurred. The OPS would then act on the request by determining whether its profit margin had fallen below the OPS minimum. The lack of cooperation between the two agencies was also due to the leadership of their chiefs. They vigorously asserted the independence of their agencies from superiors and each other and jealously guarded their respective prerogatives. As Neustadt described interagency relations, "One thing ... wage and price controllers had in common: they mistrusted those above them and were cool to one another (Neustadt, 1960: 14) . For the White House to negotiate a settlement of the dispute, however, would have required coordination of both the price and wage aspects of the issue. But it was OPS and WSB policy not to cooperate on wage and price stabilization. Thus, the White House was hindered in its attempts to negotiate a settlement, making the resulting impasse with the companies almost inevitable. In the ensuing conference with the president, Wilson defended his plan, claiming that Truman had given him express authorization to grant whatever price increase was necessary to arrive at a settlement. Wilson, however, had already lost favor in the White House because of his earlier statement about the WSB proposals. Labor, a friend of Truman's which had loyally supported him in his 1948 campaign, had always mistrusted Wilson, considering him thoroughly probusiness in outlook.5 Furthermore, the day before the meeting, the industry had reneged on its offer to Wilson and was pressing for an even higher price increase while at the same time making no promise to settle with the union (Neustadt, 1960: 1 5). The position of Wilson, the czar of the whole mobilization program, was in effect being undercut from all sides.
Arnall advanced the argument before Truman that giving into the companies would both discredit the whole price stabilization program and lead to a recurrence of inflation, steel being such a basic industry in the economy. Implicit in Arnall's argument was his threat of resignation. It was no empty threat; in July, after settling with the union, the companies were allowed a price rise well above OPS standards. As a result, OPS policies became discredited and Arnall quit a few weeks later (Newsweek, 1952: 65). date to settle at any cost and criticized him for giving into the industry's demands for higher prices. Wilson, rebuked in front of two of his subordinates, felt that his usefulness to the administration had come to an end and resigned the next day, March 29.6 Thus, the decision to resist the industry's demands for a price increase was not so much an exercise in rational counterinflationary strategy by the president-the final settlement with the industry in July never produced the inflationary spiral they thought it would-as it was a reflection of the relative standing of Arnall and Putnam. Moreover, the explanations of Models 11 and III are at a comparatively lower level. Model 11 achieves a measure of precision with ts explanation in terms of organizational routines at period t-1, but, as this study suggests, an organization's routines account for only a portion of its effect on a result. The explanation of Model Ill is the weakest of the three; its method of explanation is in essence only a recounting of the bargaining game. It is not clear what causes a player to have more influence than another. Further, such a method of explanation could easily become idiosyncratic, making the construction of generally applicable models difficult. Its treatment of the decisional process is a more realistic one but, as in most realistic theories of social processes, it is at the expense of scientific rigor.
Truman now had to choose between

On
As Allison emphasized, these three models should not be considered the only approaches; there are other possible models, especially those of a more psychological character. The group dynamics approach developed by Janis (1972) in his Victims of Groupthink could be yet another insightful method of analyzing the seizures.
Another conceptual approach to the steel seizure would be the one developed by Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (1 962) in "Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Affairs." This framework, however, is designed only to answer the question of how the decision was made. The question why is more significant to ask. In addition, answering the question why necessarily involves answering the question how.
In spite of its weaknesses, the Allison approach is provocative in that it is still useful in explaining political decisions. Reality is many-faced; to explain it, it is necessary to break it down into its component parts. The Allison approach makes the necessary first step in this process by focusing on three different actors-the rational unitary actor, the organization, and the bureaucratic game player-and by asking three systematic sets of questions about them.
The Allison approach can thus be used to explain a wide array of presidential decisions, as, for example, Nixon's decision to impose wage-price controls in August 1971. From a Model I perspective, it is an action maximizing Nixon's objective of preventing continued inflation and its damaging effects politically. A Model 11 analysis might deal with the economic forecasts of the Labor and Commerce Departments. A Model III explanation might focus on the relative influence of John Connally, George Schultz, John Erlichman, and others. Such an approach might not be applicable to all presidential decisions, however. For example, President Kennedy's decision to resist United States Steel's price increase was made instantaneously upon learning of the price hike. Much of the government's activity during the crisis consisted of presidential and cabinet officials' harangues against United States Steel. The only governmental agency to get significantly involved in the crisis was the Justice Department. The whole incident was over in 72 hours. Consequently, studying various organizational processes or bureaucratic politics during the crisis might be a trivial exercise, yielding little of interest.
One of the most striking aspects of the 1 952 steel dispute was how little Truman was able to influence events. Though nominally their superior, Truman was for the most part unable to direct the actions of the stabilization agencies. After Truman ordered Secretary Sawyer to implement the wage--price plan, Sawyer simply sat on his hands. Though the President asked Congress for legislative assistance in the crisis, it did nothing. In spite of Truman's pleas that their strike would endanger the lives of the troops, the companies and the steelworkers failed to come to terms. The limitations of the president's power over domestic policy, as compared with his influence over foreign policy, has been the object of some study by political scientists. There is something in the nature of foreign policy leadership that makes Congress, various agencies, and even the public more amenable to carrying out the president's wishes. For one thing, the general public is less informed on foreign issues than on domestic ones. People seem more familiar with tax hikes, school integration policies, or wage and price controls and thus are more inclined to resist presidential policies in such areas. Presidential decisions in foreign affairs, furthermore, often involve the very existence of the nation and hence, the public, various agencies, and Congress feel compelled to follow his leadership.10 Mueller (1 973), for example, in War, Presidents, and Public Opinion, reported a positive correlation between dramatic presidential actions in international affairs and his popularity in the polls. Furthermore, in foreign affairs, the president acts often as commander-inchief, certainly a more majestic role than chief price controller or chief wage regulator. Chong-do Hah is a professor and chairman of the Department of Government at Lawrence University. Robert M. Lindquist is a student at the University of Texas Law School.
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Frustration with Vietnam and the American incursion into Cambodia, however, have triggered a series of stormy debates in the Senate concerning presidential war-making power See, for example, Dvorin (1971) 
